Manchester United Recruitment - Part 1

Assessing where Manchester United are in their rebuilding project, and where improvements are needed.

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This is part one of a 2-part series covering Manchester United’s rebuilding project and the club’s trajectory.

Since appointing Ole Gunnar Solskjaer to the top job in late 2018, Manchester United have significantly tightened things up at the back. The additions of Harry Maguire and Aaron Wan-Bissaka have provided a measure of defensive solidity and given United a platform to challenge the opposition without looking behind their backs. Meanwhile, the season just ended saw a major leap on the attacking front: Martial and Rashford enjoyed their finest campaigns to date, Mason Greenwood’s integration into the team is coming along nicely, and the arrival of Bruno Fernandes in the winter has given United an undeniable boost in creativity and end-product.

Current Squad Status

Nevertheless, with a host of rumored departures, this team still has some way to go before it can challenge consistently for top honors. We can see below that United struggle for depth and quality in key areas, specifically down the right, in the heart of midfielder, and at the back. (Figure 1)

Figure 1: Manchester United Squad for the 2020/21 Season

Figure 1: Manchester United Squad for the 2020/21 Season

Creativity & Incisiveness

For instance, while Solskjaer can call on a wealth of highly efficient goal-scorers, United still lack creativity and incisiveness in certain areas of the pitch (Figure 2). A disproportionate creative burden continues to fall on Paul Pogba, and the right flank remains a problem area for United. Greenwood has impressed as a finisher and final third threat from the right, but the Englishman has not excelled as a ball-carrier or chance creator. (Figures 3 & 4 - Figure 4 done by @abhisheksh_98)

Figure 2: Manchester United’s lack of incisiveness in key areas

Figure 2: Manchester United’s lack of incisiveness in key areas

Figure 3: Mason Greenwood is a great finisher, but he’s not a ball carrier

Figure 3: Mason Greenwood is a great finisher, but he’s not a ball carrier

Figure 4: Manchester United’s lack of chance creation from the right.

Figure 4: Manchester United’s lack of chance creation from the right.

Holding Midfield

In the middle of the park, United have yet to fully replace Nemanja Matic. While Fred did enjoy an impressive 2019/20 and has demonstrated an aggressive instinct in defense, he has not proven a natural successor to the Serbian (Figures 5 & 6).

Figure 5: How do Manchester United’s midfielders compare in their tackling ability

Figure 5: How do Manchester United’s midfielders compare in their tackling ability

Figure 6: How do Manchester United’s holding mid options compare in their defensive metrics

Figure 6: How do Manchester United’s holding mid options compare in their defensive metrics

This was on clear display during United’s FA Cup semifinal tie with Chelsea (Figure 7). As seen in the graphic below, Fred’s overly aggressive attempt to dispossess Chelsea midfielder Kovacic leaves the United backline seriously exposed. In such situations, a more natural holding player like Matic will be expected to wait for a more opportune moment to challenge a technically gifted opponent like Kovacic. For Fred to provide a long-term solution to United’s midfield issues, the Brazilian’s playing style will have to mature, with a greater emphasis on anticipation.

Figure 7: Fred’s aggressive nature exposed by Kovacic

Figure 7: Fred’s aggressive nature exposed by Kovacic

United’s alternative holding option, Scott McTominay, has struggled mightily in that role. (Figure 8) The 23-year-old is uncomfortable in possession. Consequently, he tends to pick out suboptimal passes and often slows down play with his indecision or inaccurate forward play, compromising his suitability as an organizer and progressive passer. (Figures 9 & 10)

Figure 8: Scott McTominay’s passing weaknesses compared to Fred & Matic

Figure 8: Scott McTominay’s passing weaknesses compared to Fred & Matic

Figure 9: An example of Scott McTominay’s indecision & technique in deeper positions

Figure 9: An example of Scott McTominay’s indecision & technique in deeper positions

Figure 10: An example of Scott McTominay’s suboptimal passing & decision making

Figure 10: An example of Scott McTominay’s suboptimal passing & decision making

In one of Manchester United’s final league clashes of the 2019/2020 season, McTominay was selected to start in the holding position behind Pogba and Bruno, both of whom are guaranteed to start in United’s midfield next season. His pass-map from that match is indicative of a player who struggles to progress the ball and is more comfortable with a more cautious approach. (Figure 11)

Figure 11: Scott McTominay’s pass map vs Crystal Palace (Source: Wyscout)

Figure 11: Scott McTominay’s pass map vs Crystal Palace (Source: Wyscout)

McTominay’s struggles are indicative of a broader problem for Manchester United. The team fares poorly when facing high-pressing opponents. The more intense the opposition press, the more difficult United find it to build up from the back, move into dangerous areas, and create game-winning chances. (Figure 12)

Figure 12: Manchester United’s struggles against intense pressing teams

Figure 12: Manchester United’s struggles against intense pressing teams

The Situation at the Back

Although both of Manchester United’s starting centre backs are comfortable with the ball, neither of them particularly excels when it comes to progressive and line breaking passes. Maguire is comfortable in possession but he tends to prefer stepping out into midfield with the ball rather than passing through. (Figure 13)

Figure 13: Manchester United’s starting CBs compared

Figure 13: Manchester United’s starting CBs compared

Their partnership suffers further when United play a high line, leaving the team vulnerable to long balls and passes in behind, as seen against Palace (Figure 14) and against Spurs earlier in the season. (Figure 15)

Figure 14: Lindelof fails to win the early header & United’s high line is exposed, with neither Lindelof nor Maguire having the pace to recover

Figure 14: Lindelof fails to win the early header & United’s high line is exposed, with neither Lindelof nor Maguire having the pace to recover

Figure 15: Although both centre backs are in a good position to recover, neither of them gets across in time.

Figure 15: Although both centre backs are in a good position to recover, neither of them gets across in time.

Conclusion

To improve on their third-place league finish and disappointing exit from the final four of the Europa League, Manchester United must prioritize quality down the right, in midfield, and at the back. They will also need to add depth in key areas.

Part 2 of this series explores possible solutions to the aforementioned issues.

Data Sources: Statsbomb via Fbref | Wyscout

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