Manchester City 1-1 Liverpool Match Analysis
Looking at the key areas from Manchester City and Liverpool’s early season clash.
Overview of Match:
Gabriel Jesus was back for City to lead the line, with Ferran Torres preferred on the right to provide City with width. The rest of the team practically picked itself with no real surprises.. Liverpool meanwhile, went into the match with questions over who whether the in-form Diogo Jota would start over Roberto Firmino. Jurgen Klopp went with both in a 4-4-2/4-2-3-1 shape. Mohamed Salah partnered Roberto Firmino up-front, with Jota taking his place on the right hand side.
The match started off at a very high pace, with both teams playing with intensity which resulted in an end to end first half. The second half was more cagey as both teams were more conservative in their approach in risk of losing. This resulted in a match where few chances were created in open-play, with the xG of both teams being heavily skewed by their penalties as both teams contained the other well. Figure 1 shows the xG timeline of the match.
Manchester City Build-Up v Liverpool Pressing:
Liverpool pressed in a compact 4-4-2 mid-block. The two strikers (Firmino & Salah) were tasked with closing down the central progression to force Manchester City out wide. This made it difficult for Manchester City to progress the ball as Liverpool were well-positioned to deal with the ball in wider areas. According to Football Reference, Manchester City completed 32 progressive passes and 32 passes into the final third. This is a significant drop when comparing it to their season averages of 45 progressive passes and 50 passes into the final third. An example of this is show in Figure 2.
With City putting emphasis on playing the ball out from the back, they had trouble effectively moving up the pitch. Most of their passes in their own half were short and lateral as they struggled to break Liverpool down. As soon as they went wide, Liverpool were well-positioned to close the spaces down, resulting in Manchester City having to back central or backwards to recycle possession. The pass flow and heat-map in Figure 3 show the build-up struggles Manchester City faced in their own half.
Rodri & Gundogan
With Rodri & Gundogan the deepest midfielders for Manchester City, they were tasked with progressing the ball up-field. Liverpool’s shape made it difficult for them. Both players were unable to exert much influence, with them having to recycle possession more often than moving the ball up the pitch. Their combined pass maps in Figure 4 show how they struggled to the move the ball forward, instead relying on short lateral passes more often than not.
Manchester City Final Third & Progression:
With Liverpool closing down the central areas, Manchester City’s use of switches was crucial. Their only goal of the game an example of this. The goal is seen in Figure 5.
As Sadio Mane goes to press Ruben Dias, he leaves space on the right and City quickly switch the ball to that area. Walker now has plenty of space, forcing Wijnaldum to shift wide, leaving De Bruyne in a dangerous position in zone 14. Although it was effective in the above example, City were not able to do this consistently during the game. Figure 6 shows all of Manchester City’s switches against Liverpool.
We can see from the figure above that Manchester City attempted to find space out wide using their switches, but Liverpool were generally well disciplined to prevent situations such as the one that resulted in the goal. City were also often slow in midfield, allowing Liverpool to regroup. Figure 6 also shows that City looked to target Liverpool’s left hand side more through switches, with Mane more prone to stepping out to press than Jota.
This meant that most of City’s ball progression into the final third came from these wider areas. In the final third, they didn't commit too many men forward in fears of conceding a transition as Liverpool remained compact, with not many passes into the area or Zone 14 completed. They were often regressive out wide. (Figure 7).
Figure 7 shows a clear emphasis on progressing the ball into wider areas, with not much success centrally, while the quality and incisiveness in the final third was often lacking. The clip below (Figure 8) shows an example of City in the final third, where they refrained from pushing too many men forward and having to go backwards from a wider position.
As a result of this, City’s most dangerous player, Kevin De Bruyne, had a relatively quiet performance. With City focusing on the wider areas, he often found himself going wide to receive the ball. (Figure 9)
Liverpool Build-Up v Manchester City Pressing:
Compared to Manchester City, Liverpool’s build-up was more direct as they looked to bypass their midfield and get to the front 4. They often looked to exploit the area between the CB & FB with a ball over the top. An early chance was created due to this. (Figure 10)
As soon as the ball is played towards Trent Alexander-Arnold, Firmino/Salah/Mane all start making runs behind Manchester City’s defense as Trent plays a first time ball between Laporte and Cancelo to free Firmino in behind.
With Liverpool setting up in a 4-2-4 in attack, it’s no surprise they were more direct than City. According to Football Reference they had 48% of their touches in the middle third, compared to 55% for City as they looked to bypass their midfield by find the front four. Figure 11 below shows the more direct approach Liverpool took, with the ball not making it’s way to the centre of the pitch as much as City.
Liverpool Progression & Final Third
Similar to City, Liverpool also had trouble progressing the ball in central areas. Manchester City pressed in a 4-4-2, with Jesus & KDB often looking to close down the spaces for the centre-backs to progress the ball, and thus leaving space out wide. This, coupled with Liverpool’s more direct approach, meant that City often looked to go long to exploit the areas out wide and between the centre back and full-back. When they got into the final third, their decision making was often lacking while they struggled to take advantage of their numerical superiorities. In the second half, they adopted a more conservative approach and did not commit as many men forward in the risk of losing the match.
Figure 12 shows Liverpool’s pass map into and from the final third.
Similar to City, Liverpool attempted to progress the ball into the wider areas but lacked the quality at times to create any clear openings in those situations.
The clip below (Figure 13) shows an example of a promising opportunity for Liverpool in the final third, eventually broken down by poor decision making and not having enough men forward.
What start off as a promising situation, with City players rushing back to defend and Liverpool having 5 men forward, it eventually breaks down with City able to regroup. Milner receives the ball out wide and delays playing the ball into Jota at the far side of the pitch. This allows City to get back into shape as they too did not commit many men forward. Milner eventually has to recycle possession to Shaqiri, who fails to break down City as they now have the numerical advantage in their box as Liverpool do not commit more men forward to protect themselves against a transition.
Overall, a draw was a fair result in what was an interesting battle. Both sides settled down in the 2nd half after a frantic 1st half. They seemed content with a draw in fear of losing more points to the other.
Overall, a draw was a fair result in what was an interesting battle. Both sides settled down in the 2nd half after a frantic 1st half. They seemed content with a draw in fear of losing more points to the other.
Sources: Football Reference (https://fbref.com/en/)